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I. INTRODUCTION
Character evidence exists in three forms: First, testimony of a
witness' personal opinion of the defendant; second, testimony regard-
ing the defendant's reputation; and third, testimony regarding the
defendant's past conduct.' Of the three, evidence pertaining to the
defendant's past conduct is the most probative of the defendant's
character, but is also the most likely to create prejudice against him.2
At common law, evidence of a defendant's character was not admissi-
ble when introduced to imply that, on a given occasion, the defendant
acted in conformity with his character, because this would constitute
circumstantial proof of an ultimate consequential fact, the actions of
the accused.
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) incorporated the common law
rule against the circumstantial use of character evidence, and made it
applicable to evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.4 The rule
1. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 443 (2d ed. 1972).
2. Id.
3. E. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 2:18 (1984); Graham,
Evidence as to Character: Circumstantial Use, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 234, 234 (1983).
4. Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
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excluding uncharged misconduct evidence is not based on lack of rele-
vance, because a defendant's past criminal activity is likely to be pro-
bative of his guilt in a particular case.' Rather, the uncharged
misconduct evidence is excluded because it may encourage the
factfinder; usually a jury, to convict the defendant because he is a bad
person who is likely to have committed the crime charged, or because
the defendant may have escaped punishment for earlier wrongdoings,
and not because the government has made a sufficient showing of evi-
dence that the defendant committed the crime charged.6
Rule 404(b) does not automatically require the exclusion of evi-
dence of the defendant's past misconduct. Although the evidence
may not be admitted to prove the defendant's propensity to commit
the crime charged, the Rule expressly permits use of uncharged mis-
conduct evidence to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.7 This
list is not exhaustive, but it indicates that use of uncharged miscon-
duct evidence should be predicated upon some theory of relevance
leading to resolution of an ultimate issue that may arise in a given
case. 8
of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
FED. R. EVID. 404; see also FED. R. EvID. 404 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 221
(Rule 404(b) "deals with a specialized but important application of the general rule excluding
circumstantial use of character evidence.").
5. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 233 (lst ed. 1904); see also United States v. Shackleford,
738 F.2d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 1984) (Evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts almost always
suggests that the defendant had the propensity to commit other crimes, and errors in admitting
such evidence affect the fundamental fairness of the trial.).
6. As Dean Wigmore noted:
The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal-whether judge or jury-is
to give excessive weight to the vicious .record of crime thus exhibited, and either
to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or take the proof of it as
justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge.
J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, at 233; see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 443; see also Bray,
Evidence of Prior 'Uncharged Offenses and the Growth of Constitutional Restrictions, 28 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 489 (1974) (analyzing the constitutional protections that might be infringed by
the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence).
7. For the full text of Rule 404(b), see supra note 4; see also United States v. Salisbury,
662 F.2d 738, 741 (11 th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1107 (1982) (uncharged misconduct
evidence is reliable proof of criminal predisposition for the purpose of rebutting the defense of
entrapment).
8. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE
§ 5239 (1978). In criminal cases, three ultimate issues may arise: First, corpus delecti, or the
substantial fact that a crime has been committed; second, the identity of the accused as the
person who committed the crime; and third, mens rea, or the mental state of the accused. Id.
§ 5239 at 460. For example, the government may introduce evidence of other crimes to
establish the defendant's motive to commit the crime charged. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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Any uncharged misconduct evidence that is admissible pursuant
to Rule 404(b) is subject to a Rule 403 analysis: If the probative value
of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice created by admission of the evidence, it is inadmissible. 9 In
the majority of federal jurisdictions, evidence offered pursuant to Rule
404(b) is subject to additional restrictions. The proponent of the evi-
dence must articulate an independent theory of relevance, and until
recently, the proponent was required to prove the uncharged miscon-
duct outside of the jury's presence, under a clear and convincing or
preponderance standard of proof, prior to admission into evidence.'0
Although motive is not an essential element of most crimes, proof of the defendant's motive
may serve as proof of either the perpetrator's identity or the defendant's state of mind, both of
which may be ultimate issues in the case. Professors Wright and Graham have noted that
"[o]nly by tracing the line of relevance through to one of the ultimate issues in the case can the
court insure that the fact which the evidence is supposed to prove is in issue and thus prevent
sham use of the rule." C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra, § 5239, at 467.
9. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
10. As this issue went to press, the Supreme Court of the United States held that district
courts need not make a preliminary finding that the government has proved the "other act" by
a preponderance of the evidence before it is submitted to the jury. Huddleston v. United
States, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 1501 (1988). Rather, uncharged misconduct evidence should be
admitted if there is sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find, by a preponderance, that the
defendant committed the uncharged act. Id. The trial court may assess whether sufficient
evidence has been offered to permit the jury to make the requisite finding at a later point in the
trial. Id. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 8:03; see United States v. Leight, 818 F.2d
1297, 1303 (7th Cir. 1987) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that two days of
testimony from more than a dozen government witnesses, on direct and cross-examination,
established by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had physically abused several
of her children, despite the court's failure to permit the defendant to present contrary
evidence); United States v. Payne, 805 F.2d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (introduction of guns
into evidence, together with testimony showing that the guns had been seized from the
defendant's apartment, was clear and convincing evidence of an extrinsic crime); United States
v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310, 1318 (10th Cir. 1983) (testimony by several law enforcement officers
referring to "ongoing investigations" into the alleged prior criminal activity of the defendant,
including "gambling, stolen property, [and] things like that," lacked the. specificity necessary
to satisfy the government's clear and convincing burden of proof that the defendant had
participated in these other crimes); United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102, 107 (7th Cir. 1979)
(the function of the clear and convincing evidence standard is to prevent the jury from
considering evidence that would establish the defendant's commission of a priorcrime "only
by highly circumstantial inferences"); McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief Quanta
of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293 (1982) (discussing
standards of proof, their inherent ambiguity, and their potential threat to the constitutional
rights they were intended to protect). But see United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1432 (6th
Cir. 1986) (courts may admit extrinsic crimes evidence if the government establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the extrinsic crimes); United
States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 913 (5th Cir. 1978) (the trial judge determines whether
sufficient evidence exists for the jury to find that the defendant actually committed the
extrinsic offense). For a general discussion of the standard of proof for the admissibility of
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In addition, if the trial judge rules that the evidence is admissible, the
jury should be instructed to refrain from using the evidence to infer
the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged, and further,
to consider the guilt or innocence of the defendant solely with respect
to the crime for which the defendant is being tried."'
The inherent difficulty in the application of Rule 404(b) is that
some conduct of the defendant that is not explicitly referred to in the
charging document may nonetheless stand in such a relation to the
crime charged that it cannot be considered wholly independent.'
2
Courts have referred to this uncharged criminal activity as "inextrica-
bly intertwined" with the crime charged because it is not totally sepa-
rate from the crime charged.' 3  The range of evidence that is
other crimes evidence, see Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes
Evidence: A Sliding Scale of Proof, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 566 (1984).
S11. See Carter. v. United States, 549 F.2d 77, 78 (8th Cir. 1977). (the trial court's
instructions, admonishing the jury to ignore the defendant's possible involvement with
narcotics and focus instead on the defendant's guilt or innocence on the charge of possession of
a firearm, were adequate limiting instructions accompanying other crimes evidence); see also
United States v. Martin, 794 F.2d 1531, 1533 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (the trial court need not give the
jury a limiting instruction on the use of uncharged misconduct evidence that is not extrinsic to
the crime charged, because the evidence does not fall within the scope of rule 404(b)).
12. For example, a drunken driver who causes someone's death in an automobile accident
may be charged with voluntary manslaughter, without specifically being charged with driving
under the influence of an intoxicating substance. If the court considers "driving under the
influence" to be an extrinsic crime, evidence of intoxication would be subject to the more
stringent admission requirements attached to Rule 404(b). The evidence would not be
admissible to prove that the defendant had a general propensity to commit voluntary
manslaughter. Moreover, the prosecution would be required to present to the judge clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant was intoxicated before submitting that evidence to the
jury under some other theory of relevance. See supra note 10. The jury's use of the evidence
would also be subject to a limiting instruction. See supra note 11. Even if the judge considered
driving under the influence to be a lesser included offense, and therefore not extrinsic, evidence
of intoxication would be admissible only if its probative value was not substantially outweighed
by its potential for prejudice. See United States v. Weeks, 716 F.2d 830, 832 (11th Cir. 1983)
(evidence showing that a federal agent was investigating the defendant for theft of motor
vehicles was inextricably intertwined with the charge that the defendant assaulted the agent
during the time that he was under investigation); United States v. Black, 692 F.2d 314, 316
(4th Cir. 1982) (the defendant's act of throwing human feces at a correctional officer
immediately following an armed confrontation with him was evidence of a continuing course
of interference with the correctional officer's execution of his duties, and not evidence of a
separate crime within the contemplation of Rule 404(b)). But see United States v. Levy, 731
F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1984) (drug transaction involving a small amount of drugs for
sampling was separate from the charged drug transaction occurring six hours later); cf. United
States v. Stovall, 825 F.2d 817, 823 (5th Cir. 1987) (for sentencing purposes, if one offense
requires proof of a fact that is not necessarily required to prove another offense, then the two
offenses do not constitute the same offense).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1313 (8th Cir. 1986) (evidence of the
defendants' escape from prison, theft of a prison truck, and other robberies, was an integral
part of an extended criminal transaction, and therefore fell outside the scope of Rule 404(b));
United States v. Weeks, 716 F.2d 830, 832 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (evidence that a federal agent was
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inextricably intertwined with the crime charged is as varied as the fact
patterns of specific cases. Courts have consistently recognized certain
relationships in which uncharged misconduct is inextricably inter-
twined with the crime charged.14 Courts have not defined the scope
of inextricably intertwined evidence, however, and no guidelines for
determining the limits of this class of evidence exist.
This Comment analyzes the inextricably intertwined relation-
ships between certain uncharged misconduct evidence and the crime
charged with a view toward determining whether these relationships
remove the evidence from the purview of Rule 404(b). After a consid-
eration of the historical development and underlying policies of the
general rule excluding evidence of other crimes for the purpose of
establishing a defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged,
this Comment suggests that evidence of criminal activity committed
by the defendant contemporaneously with the crime charged, as a
predicate to the crime charged, or as otherwise explaining the context
of the crime charged, is not the type of evidence contemplated by
Rule 404(b), and should therefore be admissible without regard to the
limitations of the more stringent admission standards attached to
Rule 404(b) evidence.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE PROHIBITING
THE USE OF UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE
The rule prohibiting the use of evidence of other crimes to prove
the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged has its roots
in Great Britain's Treason Act of 169 5. 5 Parliament passed the Trea-
son Act in reaction to the repressive practices of the Court of the Star
Chamber, which admitted evidence of the defendant's prior miscon-
duct as proof of guilt of the crime charged. 16 The Treason Act
reformed evidentiary rules, and expressly provided that only conduct
investigating the defendant for theft of motor vehicles, at the time the agent was assaulted, was
inextricably intertwined with the charged offense, and therefore was not governed by Rule
404(b)); United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 211 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) (pistols,
cocaine, and methamphetamines, obtained from the defendant's and co-conspirators' homes,
were not extrinsic evidence, and therefore Rule 404(b) did not apply); United States v. Two
Eagle, 633 F.2d 93, 95 (8th Cir. 1980) (evidence that, shortly after the victim was assaulted,
the juvenile defendant was seen driving the victim's car was an integral part of the offense
charged, and was therefore not governed by Rule 404(b)).
14. See infra notes 94-147 and accompanying text.
15. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 2:24; J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, at 233; Reed,
Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidence in Federal Criminal Trials, 50
U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 716 (1981). For a detailed discussion of the development of the
character rule in England, see Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence:
England, 46 HARV. L. REV. 954 (1933).
16. Reed, supra note 15, at 716.
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that had been specifically mentioned in the indictment could be
proven against a defendant at trial for treason.'
7
The Treason Act inevitably prompted the development of the
character rule in all criminal trials. 8 During the eighteenth century,
jurists recognized that it was inconsistent to prohibit the introduction
of a defendant's uncharged misconduct in trials for treason, but to
allow that evidence in other criminal trials. 19 In addition, the emerg-
ing principle of fundamental fairness, articulated in the Magna Carta
and developed through the common law, gradually evolved into a rule
prohibiting the use of character evidence to circumstantially prove the
crime charged.20
Prior to 1840, the rule prohibiting the use of other crimes evi-
dence was defined in inclusionary terms: Evidence of other crimes
was admissible unless the sole purpose of its introduction was to sug-
gest the defendant's character as a basis for inferring that the defend-7
ant committed the crime charged. 2' Thus, English courts permitted
the use of uncharged misconduct evidence if it was probative of a rele-
vant issue other than the defendant's character.22 For example,
courts admitted other crimes evidence when a party could establish its
relevance in terms of criminal intent, absence of mistake, knowledge,
identity, or the existence of a continuing criminal operation. 23 Ulti-
mately, courts began to treat these independent theories of relevance
as exceptions to the general rule prohibiting the use of other crimes
evidence.
These exceptions transformed the rule regulating the use of other
crimes evidence into one of exclusion: Other crimes evidence was
admissible only if it fell within one of the recognized exceptions to the
general rule excluding uncharged misconduct. 24 This exclusionary
version of the rule caused the courts to evaluate uncharged miscon-
duct evidence mechanically. 25 Thus, courts excluded any uncharged
17. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 2:24; J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, at 233; Reed,
supra note 15, at 717.
18. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 2:24.
19. Reed, supra note 15, at 717.
20. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 2:24; J. MCKELVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE at 144 (1st ed. 1898); J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 194; Reed, supra note 15, at
717.
21. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 2:26; Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact
Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1938).
22. J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, at 233; Reed, supra note 15, at 718-19.
23. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 2:26; Reed, supra note 15, at 718.
24. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 2:26. For a discussion of the evolution of the
character rule in the United States until the early 1900's, see Stone, supra note 21.
25. Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE
L.J. 763, 767-68 (1961).
[Vol. 42:947
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misconduct evidence that did not fit within one of the exceptions
without offering any critical analysis as to whether the evidence was
relevant in the context of the facts of the particular case.26
The English rule pertaining to the admissibility of other crimes
evidence influenced the development of the doctrine in American
courts." In keeping with the post-revolution political climate in
which the population was keenly aware of governmental repression,
courts resolved any ambiguity in the law in the defendant's favor.28 It
is not surprising, therefore, that in early decisions, courts greatly
restricted the use of other crimes evidence. 29 By the mid- 1800's, how-
ever, state courts had expanded the permissible uses of other crimes
evidence to include motive, intent, knowledge, and design or plan.3°
By this time, federal courts permitted the use of evidence of
uncharged crimes to prove intent, guilty knowledge, and motive. 31
By 1896, state and federal courts had expanded the permissible
uses of other crimes evidence to include evidence showing activity
leading to the crime charged. 32 Evidence that did not form a link in
the chain of circumstances leading to the commission of the charged
offense was inadmissible.33 Thus, uncharged misconduct evidence
was inadmissible unless the prosecutor could establish a causal con-
nection between the uncharged misconduct and the crime charged,
which implied that the uncharged misconduct was a distinct and sep-
arate crime, or unless the evidence was offered to prove intent, guilty
knowledge, motive, or design or plan.
26. Id.
27. The colonial charters of independence incorporated some of the fundamental concepts
set forth in the Treason Act of 1695. See Reed, supra note 15, at 720-21 (The Virginia
Declaration of Rights required that the government notify the defendant before trial of all the
offenses for which he was to be tried.).
28. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 2:27.
29. Walker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 574 (1829) (restricting other crimes
evidence to cases in which the crime charged could not be explained without reference to the
other crimes, and cases in which the other crimes evidence was proof of the defendant's
knowledge); United States v. Mitchell, 26 F. Cas. 1282 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (evidence showing
that the defendant had robbed the United States mail while committing alleged acts of treason
was inadmissible other crimes evidence).
30. Reed, The Development of the Propensity Rule in Federal Criminal Causes 1840-1975,
51 U. CIN. L. REV. 299, 301-02 (1982) [hereinafter Reed, The Development of the Propensity
Rule]; Reed, supra note 15, at 723.
31. Reed, The Development of the Propensity Rule, supra note 30, at 303.
32. People v. McLaughlin, 150 N.Y. 365, 44 N.E. 1017 (1896). In McLaughlin, the
defendant was charged with extortion, and the trial court admitted evidence pertaining to the
defendant's prior acts of extortion. Id. at 1028. The Court of Appeals of New York held that
the evidence was inadmissible, because the prior acts of extortion did not constitute a link in
the chain of facts surrounding the crime for which the defendant was charged. Id. at 1025.
33. Id. at 391, N.E. at 1025.
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In the landmark case of People v. Molineux,34 the Court of
Appeals of New York discussed in detail the permissible uses of
uncharged misconduct evidence.3 In keeping with established com-
mon law principles, the court held that the state could not offer evi-
dence of other crimes to prove that the defendant was guilty of the
crime charged.36 In dicta, the court listed theories of relevance under
which other crimes evidence could be used, including motive, intent,
absence of mistake or accident, identity, and common scheme or
plan. 7
In discussing the permissible uses of uncharged misconduct evi-
dence, the Molineux court referred to the common scheme or plan
theory of relevance.38 Under this theory, uncharged misconduct evi-
dence was admissible when "two or more crimes [were] committed by
the same person in pursuance of a single design, or under circum-
stances which render it impossible to prove one without proving
all."' 39 The court noted that some connection between the uncharged
act and the charged crime must exist "in fact and in the mind of the
actor" before the evidence would be admissible. 4' The common plan
or scheme theory covered situations in which the uncharged act was
committed in contemplation of, and in preparation for, the crime
charged.41 It also included uncharged misconduct that occurred con-
temporaneously with the crime charged, such that one was indistin-
34. 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901).
35. Id. at 293, 61 N.E. at 294.
36. "The general rule of evidence applicable to criminal trials is that the state cannot prove
against a defendant any crime not alleged in the indictment, either as a foundation for a
separate punishment, or as aiding the proofs that he is guilty of the crime charged." Id. at 291,
61 N.E. at 293.
37. Id. at 293, 61 N.E. at 294. The court recognized that it could not state the exceptions
with categorical precision, yet it appeared to treat the list of exceptions as exclusive. See Stone,
supra note 21, at 1027. Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, most federal
courts followed the exclusionary approach to the rule governing admissibility of uncharged
misconduct evidence: Evidence of other crimes is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the
recognized exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. Broadway, 477 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1973);
Davis v. United States, 370 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1966); Swann v. United States, 195 F.2d 689
(4th Cir. 1952); Green v. United States, 176 F.2d 541 (1st Cir. 1949); Kempe v. United States,
151 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1945); United States v. Fawcett, 115 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1940). The
majority of courts readily adopted the exclusionary approach to the rule, perhaps because it
was easily and rather mechanically applied. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 28, § 2:27;
Reed, The Development of the Propensity Rule, supra note 30, at 303. For a discussion of the
degree to which the courts have riddled the exclusionary version of the character rule with
exceptions, see Slough, Other Vices, Other Crimes: An Evidentiary Dilemma, 20 KAN. L. REV.
411, 417 (1972).






guishable from the other.42
The Molineux court's discussion of the admissibility of
uncharged misconduct evidence to show a common plan or scheme
referred, in part, to a fact pattern similar to that in Capone v. United
States.43 In Capone, the defendant was indicted for failing to pay
income tax." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit ruled that evidence indicating that Capone had earned money
from the illegal sale of bootleg beer during the years of 1922 to 1925
was admissible to prove that, during those years, Capone had received
income which he concealed, and for which he failed to file income
tax.4" It would have been impossible to prove tax evasion without
proof of bootlegging, and therefore, practically speaking, the crimes
were inseparable."
Following cases such as Capone, courts developed a doctrine that
evidence of uncharged misconduct was admissible when it was "so
closely blended or connected with the one on trial ... that proof of
one incidentally involves the other; or explains the circumstances
thereof."47 This exception broadened the class of admissible other
crimes evidence by permitting not only the introduction of uncharged
misconduct evidence when it was impossible to prove the crime
charged without revealing the uncharged misconduct, but also when
the uncharged misconduct evidence explained the circumstances sur-
rounding the charged crime.48 Courts began to refer to these two dis-
tinct types of evidence as "res gestae": evidence that explained the
circumstances of a crime, and evidence of uncharged misconduct that
42. Id. at 300, 61 N.E. at 297.
43. 51 F.2d 609 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 669 (1931).
44. Id. at 611.
45. Id. at 611-12.
46. Id. at 619.
47. See Bracey v. United States, 142 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 762
(1944); Behrle v. United States, 100 F.2d 714, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Copeland v. United States,
2 F.2d 637, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
48. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5239. By connecting the phrases
"proof of one incidentally involves the other" and "explains the circumstances thereof" with
the disjunctive "or," courts have implied that the terms are alternative descriptions of the same
thing See, e.g., United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Deering, 592 F.2d 1003 (8th Cir. 1979); Ignacio v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970); Bracey v. United States, 142 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 322
U.S. 762 (1944). Not all evidence pertaining to the circumstances of a crime, however, stands
in such a relation to the crime charged that proof of the crime charged necessarily reveals
those circumstances. For example, the fact that a defendant sold drugs to an unnamed,
unindicted third party is not necessarily revealed in proving the defendant guilty of selling
drugs to a government agent at about the same time, even though it may explain the
circumstances of the charged crime. The omission of evidence of the drug sale to the
unnamed, unindicted third party would not prevent the government from proving its case.
19881
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was necessarily revealed in the proof of the crime charged. Res gestae
evidence included facts and declarations that were incidental to the
main facts or transaction, but necessary to illustrate their character; 49
acts that illustrated, explained, or interpreted other parts of the trans-
action of which they were a part;50 the component parts of the princi-
pal fact or transaction;5 evidence that completed the story of the
crime charged;52 and acts that were an immediate accompaniment of
the act charged, so closely causally connected as to constitute a part
of the act charged, and without which the factfinder might not have
properly understood the main fact or transaction.
3
The implementation of the res gestae concept in American crimi-
nal trials marked a shift which better served the needs of the parties.
When courts admitted only uncharged misconduct evidence that was
necessarily revealed in the proof of the crime charged, they were pri-
marily attentive, perhaps inadvertently, to the government's need to
prove the crime charged. Conversely, when courts began to group
uncharged misconduct evidence necessarily revealed in the proof of
the crime charged, with evidence of the circumstances within which a
crime had occurred, and referred to both of them as res gestae evi-
dence, the focus had shifted'to the factfinder's need to understand the
context within which the crime had occurred.
Courts admitted res gestae evidence as an exception to the exclu-
sionary rule, and implicitly treated it as evidence of other crimes.54
Thus, in United States v. Miller,5 the Seventh Circuit admitted evi-
dence that the defendant had disarmed a police officer and departed in
a stolen police car, because it constituted "links in the chain of
events" explaining the circumstances surrounding the defendant's
theft of another car, for which he was charged.56 In United States v.
Turner,57 the same court admitted evidence pertaining to a drug sale
two days before the charged drug transaction, because the uncharged
drug sale "triggered" the charged offense. 58 In support of its position,
the Turner court stated that, although the events leading to the com-
mission of the charged crime were other crimes, they were admissible
49. Pugh v. State, 30 Ala. 572, 575, 10 So. 2d 833, 836 (1942).
50. Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Daly, 129 Ill. App. 519, 525 (1906).
51. Lipscomb v. Estelle, 507 F.2d 708, 709 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Crowe, 188
F.2d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 1951).
52. United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1971).
53. Wilson v. State, 181 Md. 1, 4, 26 A.2d 770, 772 (1942).
54. Reed, The Development of the Propensity Rule, supra note 30, at 319.
55. 508 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1974).
56. Id. at 449.
57. 423 F.2d 481 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 967 (1970).
58. Id. at 484.
[Vol. 42:947
UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE
pursuant to the exception that such evidence was "so blended or con-
nected" with the crime charged that it explained the circumstances of
the crime charged.59
Other federal courts characterized res gestae evidence as part of
the crime charged, 6° thus circumventing the rule against other crimes
evidence altogether. In Ignacio v. Guam,61 the defendants were
charged with murder, and the government's theory was that the
defendants had pushed and shot the victim from a particular car.62
As part of its case, the government was allowed to introduce evidence
establishing that the defendants had stolen the car in question the
night before the murder, because the theft of the car was an inextrica-
ble part of the murder itself.6"
Regardless of the particular theory under which the government
introduced other crimes evidence, it still had to meet a given standard
of proof before the evidence would be admitted. Prior to the enact-
ment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, other crimes evidence was
admissible only if the government met a "clear and convincing" stan-
dard of proof,' or a similar standard, such as "plain, clear and con-
clusive, "65 or simply "plain." 66  The Second Circuit, required the
government to prove the extrinsic crime by a preponderance of the
evidence before admitting it into evidence.67
Once a proponent met the requisite standard of proof, the court
assessed whether the probative value of the evidence was substantially
59. Id.
60. United States v. Persico, 425 F.2d 1375, 1384 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869
(1970); Ignacio v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513, 519 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970);
Rodriguez v. United States, 284 F.2d 863, 867 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 1001
(1962).
61. 413 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970).
62. Id. at 520.
63. Id.; see also United States v. Weems, 398 F.2d 274, 275 (4th Cir. 1968) (acts occumng
during the charged kidnapping were integral parts of the offense charged).
64. United States v. Ostrowsky, 501 F.2d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 1974); Gart v. United States,
294 F. 66, 67 (8th Cir. 1923).
65. United States v. Lawrence, 480 F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cohen,
73 F. Supp. 96, 100 (Pa. 1947). The Fifth Circuit no longer requires the government to
establish other crimes evidence by clear and convincing evidence. See United States v.
Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 913 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1978).
66. Fish v. United States, 215 F. 544, 549 (1st Cir. 1914). In People v. Molineux, the
Court of Appeals of New York stated that unless the government clearly shows that the
defendant committed the uncharged misconduct,. evidence of that misconduct is inadmissible.
168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901).
67. United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1091 (2d Cir. 1975). Ordinarily, the trial
judge makes a preliminary determination of the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the
extrinsic crime, and then admits or excludes the evidence accordingly.
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outweighed by the potential for prejudice.68 The results were not uni-
form. In United States v. Smith,69 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, observing the difficulty in deciding the admissibility of
other crimes evidence, considered the degree of certainty to which the
government had proven the occurrence of the other crime, as well as
the certainty that the defendant was the actor, in balancing the proba-
tive value of the uncharged misconduct evidence with the prejudice
likely to result from admission of the evidence.70 The Smith court
upheld the trial court's decision to admit evidence showing that the
defendant had attempted to cash a money order that had been stolen
from an envelope that had also contained the money order that the
defendant was accused of stealing.71 The court stated that the
uncharged act provided part of the context of the crime charged, and
therefore its probative value was greater than "[a]ny resultant
impugning" of the defendant's character.72 In Ignacio, however, in
which the court had explicitly considered theft as part of the crime
charged, the court did not discuss the degree of certainty to which the
uncharged theft was proven, or the prejudicial effect versus probative
value test of the uncharged misconduct evidence.73 It is unclear
whether the court in Ignacio thought that it did not need to apply
these considerations when it viewed the uncharged misconduct evi-
dence as part of the crime charged, or whether the court considered
that evidence that is part of the crime charged has such a high proba-
tive value that it automatically outweighs any potential for unfair
prejudice.
The lack of uniformity of decisions defining other crimes evi-
dence, and determining when such evidence was admissible, created a
need for Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Even since the advent of
the rule, decisions concerning the admissibility of other crimes evi-
dence have been neither uniform nor clear. Instead, federal courts
have differed in their respective interpretations and applications of
Rule 404(b), as well as in identifying the appropriate guidelines for
determining when uncharged misconduct is not other crimes evidence
within the meaning of the Rule.
68. United States v.'Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1091 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Smith,
446 F.2d 200, 203 (4th Cir. 1971).
69. 446 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1971).
70. Id. at 203.
71. Id. at 204.
72. Id.
73. Ignacio v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970).
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III. BEYOND THE COMMON LAW: THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
After the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,
federal courts generally viewed Rule 404(b) as a codification of the
common law principles existing in that jurisdiction prior to the
Rule.74 Thus, the difficulties of defining other crimes evidence and
determining when such evidence is admissible, which existed before
the Federal Rules, continued after their formulation.
The language of Rule 404(b) lends itself to both the inclusionary
and exclusionary approaches to other crimes evidence. Rule 404(b)
codified the inclusionary approach to the admissibility of other crimes
evidence in that it permits the introduction of other crimes evidence
unless its sole purpose is to show the defendant's propensity to com-
mit the act charged.75 The Rule suggests several proper uses of other
crimes evidence, however, including proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake
or accident.7 6 Indeed, the Rule gives courts flexibility in admitting
other crimes evidence, and courts applying the Rule need not pigeon-
hole the evidence into a particular exception. Rather, the focus is on
the facts of the case, the theory of relevance leading to ultimate issues
presented by the case, and the degree to which the other crimes evi-
dence has been established.77
In order to effectuate the purposes of Rule 404(b)-to protect the
defendant from being tried for an uncharged crime for which he has
not had an opportunity to prepare a defense and to avoid frustrating
the prosecution's purpose of proving the crime charged-the use of
other crimes evidence is subject to several limitations. Generally,
Rule 404(b) evidence is not admissible in the government's case in
chief unless the evidence is a necessary element of the prosecution's
prima facie case.78 Thus, the other crimes evidence must be probative
74. See, e.g., United States v. Rocha, 553 F.2d 615, 616 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Dudek, 560 F.2d 1288, 1295 (6th Cir. 1977).
75. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 2:30.
76. FED. R. EvID. 404(b). For a discussion of the problem of determining the relevancy of
other crimes evidence, see Krivosha, Lansworth & Pirsch, Relevancy: The Necessary Element
in Using Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Bad Acts to Convict, 60 NEB. L. REV. 657
(1981).
77. FED. R. EvID. 404 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 221; see also Cleary,
Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEn. L. REV. 908 (1978) (analyzing
the legal background against which the Rules were enacted, and discussing the developing
pattern of interpretation).
78. Graham, Evidence as to Character-Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts, 19 CRIM. L. BULL.
349, 354 (1983).
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of a material fact at issue in the case.79 Although the material fact for
which the other crimes evidence is introduced must be more than for-
mally in dispute, 0 some courts have admitted evidence despite a stip-
ulation offered by the defendant taking the issue out of dispute."'
These courts have reasoned that the prosecution is entitled to prove
its case with whatever evidence is otherwise admissible.8 2 Finally, in
some jurisdictions, the prosecution must articulate the evidentiary
hypotheses by which the ultimate fact might be inferred from the
other crimes evidence.8 3
The admissibility of other crimes evidence pursuant to Rule
404(b) is further limited by the requirement that the probative value
of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.8 4 Probative value is determined by a consideration
of several factors: first, the degree of certainty to which the proponent
of the other crimes evidence has proven that the other crime occurred
and that the defendant was the perpetrator; second, the degree to
which the material fact is in dispute; and third, the availability of
other, less prejudicial, evidence to establish the same material fact. 5
The prejudicial potential of the evidence is determined according to
its propensity to tempt the jury to decide the case on an improper
basis, such as a prior unrelated conviction. 6 Evidence is prejudicial if
it might give rise to an inference that the defendant is a bad person
and therefore is more likely to have committed the crime in question.
Evidence might also be prejudicial if it is likely to confuse or distract
the jury from the central issues in the case, or if it might be unduly
time consuming. 7 Evidence that is otherwise admissible under Rule
404(b) is excluded only if the probative value of the evidence is sub-
stantially outweighed by its potential prejudice.88
79. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 2:18.
80. For a discussion of the degree of dispute over the material fact that must exist before
admitting the offered proof of uncharged conduct, see E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 8:10.
81. United States v. Vretta, 790 F.2d 651, 655 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 179
(1986); United States v. Lowe, 569 F.2d 1113, 1114 (10th Cir. 1978).
82. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 8:11; see United States v. Vretta, 790 F.2d 651, 655
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 179 (1986) (trial court did not err in admitting the
government's evidence of a contemporaneous murder at the kidnap victim's home, and the
government was not bound to accept the defendant's offer to stipulate that the kidnap victim
did not consent to be taken from his home).
83. See United States v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310, 1317 (10th Cir. 1983),
84. Graham, supra note 78, at 354-56.
85. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 8:03.
86. Id.
87. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 820 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1987) (Unfair prejudice
is measured by a jury's negative response to the evidence, and is unrelated to its tendency to
make a fact in issue more or less probable.).
88. For the full text of Rule 403, see supra note 9.
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Of primary importance in determining the admissibility of other
crimes evidence is the degree to which the government can prove the
occurrence of the other crime and the defendant's participation in the
other crime. The standard of proof regulates the admission of other
crimes evidence, and is therefore a crucial adjunct to the principle of
Rule 404(b). The more stringent the standard, the less likely it is that
the government will be able to introduce the other crimes evidence,
which is often an important part of the prosecution's proof of the
crime charged. Until recently, most federal courts required that the
other crime be proven by clear and convincing evidence, out of ear-
shot of the jury, before the judge admits the evidence.89 The trial
judge determined whether the standard had been met, and then either
permitted or denied admission of the evidence. 90 The Fifth Circuit,
however, set forth a less stringent standard of proof of other crimes
evidence in United States v. Beechum.9 1 In Beechum, the court held
that the proponent of the evidence need not meet an initial clear and
convincing standard. 92  Rather, the trial judge must determine
whether sufficient evidence exists for a jury finding, and if so, the
court must then allow the jury to decide whether the other crime
occurred, and whether the defendant was the perpetrator.
93
B. Inextricably Intertwined Evidence
The limitations and preadmission requirements applicable to evi-
dence offered under Rule 404(b) govern the admissibility of evidence
pertaining to uncharged misconduct that is extrinsic to the crime
charged. Some uncharged misconduct, however, is an inseparable
part of the crime charged, or is otherwise not wholly independent
from the crime charged, even though the conduct is not referred to
explicitly in the charging document. Such evidence is often described
as being "inextricably intertwined" with the crime charged. 94
Whether uncharged misconduct is inextricably intertwined with the
crime charged depends on the facts of the specific case. A review of
federal cases reveals several relationships in which uncharged miscon-
89. See supra note 10; E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 2:08; Graham, supra note 78, at
357.
90. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 2:08.
91. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1978).
92. Id. at 913.
93. Id. at 913-14.
94. See United States v. Vretta, 790 F.2d 651, 655 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 179
(1986); United States v. Sepulveda, 710 F.2d 188, 189 (5th Cir. 1983); see also United States v.
Mitchell, 613 F.2d 779, 782 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 919 (1980) (Evidence of the
defendant's conduct the, evening before the charged shooting was "inextricably mixed and
connected" with the crime charged because it linked the defendant with the shotgun.).
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duct is inextricably intertwined with the crime charged: First,
uncharged misconduct may have been a necessary preliminary step
toward completing the crime charged; second, uncharged misconduct
may be directly probative of the crime charged; third, uncharged mis-
conduct may arise from the same transaction or transactions as the
crime charged; fourth, uncharged misconduct may form an integral
part of a particular witness' testimony concerning the crime charged;
and fifth, uncharged misconduct evidence may complete the story of
the crime charged. Although these different scenarios of inextricably
intertwined evidence may parallel or overlap with each other in cer-
tain instances, each describes a unique causal, temporal, or spatial
connection to the crime charged.
1. EVIDENCE OF UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT THAT WAS A
PRELUDE TO THE CRIME CHARGED
When courts treat evidence as inextricably intertwined with the
crime charged, and therefore outside the scope of Rule 404(b), they
may be referring to evidence of an event that was intended only as a
prelude to the crime charged, or as a necessary preliminary step
toward the completion of the crime charged. In United States v.
Torres," for example, during a drug transaction involving a small
amount of cocaine sold for sampling purposes, the defendants made
plans for the sale of a large quantity of cocaine. 96 The defendants
were ultimately charged with the second sale of cocaine.97 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that testi-
mony pertaining to the sample drug transaction was not evidence of
other crimes as contemplated by Rule 404(b), but was a necessary
preliminary to, or a means of accomplishing, the commission of the
crime charged, and therefore was admissible.98
Although in Torres, the sample drug transaction led directly to
the crime charged, a direct causal connection is not always necessary
to support admissibility. In United States v. DeLuna,99 the defendants
were convicted of charges arising out of a casino skimming conspir-
acy. 1° The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's admission of
evidence indicating that the defendants illegally obtained inside infor-
mation regarding a prospective merger of the casino, thereby estab-
lishing the defendants' subsequent hidden interest in, and control of,
95. 685 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1982).
96. Id. at 923.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 925.
99. 763 F.2d 897 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 382 (1985).
100. Id. at 897.
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the casino.' 1 The court reasoned that the uncharged misconduct
formed the basis of the crime charged. Although the uncharged crim-
inal activity did not lead directly to the crime charged, it was a neces-
sary preliminary event that facilitated the conspiracy, and therefore
was inextricably intertwined with the crime charged.'0 2  Under
DeLuna, uncharged misconduct that formed a predicate of the crime
charged is inextricably intertwined with the crime charged.
2. UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE THAT IS DIRECTLY
PROBATIVE OF THE CRIME CHARGED
When evidence of uncharged crimes is directly probative of the
crime charged, or so interwoven with the evidence needed to prove
the crime charged that it would be practically impossible to separate
one from the other, the two are inextricably intertwined. This type of
inextricably intertwined evidence differs from necessary preliminary
evidence in that the uncharged criminal activity is not a means of
accomplishing the crime in question. Rather, proof of the crime
charged necessarily reveals the proof of the other crime, because the
uncharged misconduct evidence is directly probative of the crime
charged.
In United States v. Mitchell,103 the defendant was charged with
possession of an unregistered firearm. °0 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that evidence showing that the
defendant had threatened and robbed someone at gunpoint the eve-
ning before his arrest was admissible to link the defendant with the
firearm, and was therefore directly probative of the crime charged.' 05
101. Id. at 913.
102. In both Torres and DeLuna, the uncharged misconduct evidence was relevant to
establishing the defendant's intent, knowledge, or plan, and therefore was admissible under
Rule 404(b). See United States v. Means, 695 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1983) (Evidence of an illegal
payoff scheme as a means of obtaining a branch bank permit was admissible because the
charged crime would not have occurred without the payoff scheme.); United States v.
D'Ahora, 585 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1978) (Evidence of the defendant's prior drug transaction was
one link in a chain of events leading to the drug transaction for which the defendant was
charged.).
103. 613 F.2d 779 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 919 (1980).
104. Id. at 780.
105. Id. at 782. Although the uncharged misconduct evidence in Mitchell does not fit
comfortably into any of the previously articulated theories of relevance, it may have been
relevant to the defendant's identity. See United States v. Costa, 691 F.2d 1358, 1361 (1 1th Cir.
1982) (Testimony showing that the defendant previously had dealt in cocaine was not extrinsic
to the government's charge of other cocaine dealings, because it established the relationship
between the witness and the defendant, which formed the basis of the witness' expectation that
the defendant would provide him with cocaine.); United States v. Martin, 794 F.2d 1531, 1533
(11 th Cir. 1986) (Guns seized on board the vessel constituted direct evidence of the charges of
possession with intent to distribute, conspiracy, and importation of marijuana.).
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Similarly, in United States v. Vretta ,106 the Seventh Circuit ruled that
evidence proving that the defendant, charged with kidnapping, had
murdered the kidnap victim's son immediately before the kidnapping,
was admissible because it was directly relevant to the defendant's
presence at the kidnap victim's home, and the timing of the kidnap-
ping.10 7 In both Mitchell and Vretta, the uncharged misconduct evi-
dence was directly probative of the charged offense, because it linked
the defendant to the crime charged.
3. EVIDENCE OF UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT ARISING FROM THE
SAME TRANSACTION AS THE CRIME CHARGED
When courts admit evidence of uncharged criminal activity that
arises from the same transaction or transactions as the crime charged,
they do so with the explicit or implicit assumption that it is inextrica-
bly intertwined with the crime charged."'0 This principle encom-
passes uncharged misconduct that took place contemporaneously
with the crime charged. In United States v. Kloock, 109 the defendant
was charged with importing cocaine after customs agents detected a
cocaine-saturated bathmat in the defendant's luggage. 110 The prose-
cution introduced evidence that the defendant had a false driver's
license at the time of the arrest, which he had attempted to use as a
prop to facilitate the commission of the charged offense. I1' The Elev-
enth Circuit held that possession of the false driver's license was part
of the same transaction, and was therefore admissible unless its proba-
tive value was substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair
prejudice upon admission into evidence." 2
Uncharged misconduct may have arisen from the same criminal
episode or transaction even if it did not occur contemporaneously
with the crime charged. In United States v. Derring,1 3 the defendant
was convicted of interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle." 4 At
106. 790 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 179 (1986).
107. Id. at 656. Had the court treated the evidence in Vretta as other crimes evidence, the
government could have argued that it was relevant proof of identity, motive, and intent.
108. See United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 233 (1986);
United States v. Poston, 727 F.2d 734 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 962 (1984); United
States v. Weeks, 716 F.2d 830 (1 th Cir. 1983); United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir.
1982); United States v. Gibson, 625 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1980).
109. 652 F.2d 492 (11th Cir. 1981).
110. Id. at 493.
111. Id. at 494.
112. Id. at 495. If the court had treated the evidence pertaining to the false driver's license
as other crimes evidence, it would have had difficulty determining the precise theory of
relevance under which it could be introduced under Rule 404(b).
113. 592 F.2d 1003 (8th Cir. 1979).
114. Id. at 1003.
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trial, the defendant challenged the introduction of testimony that he
had murdered the owner of the stolen car in another state.1 5 The
Eighth Circuit held that the evidence was admissible because the mur-
der and the car theft were part of a single criminal transaction over a
four-day period. 116 Similarly, in United States v. Bass,117 evidence
that the defendants had escaped from jail, stolen several cars, and
robbed several people, before stealing the car for which they were
charged, was admissible because each of the events constituted an
integral part of an extended criminal transaction occurring over sev-
eral days. 8
If the defendant has participated in a scheme of criminal activity
culminating in uncharged misconduct, evidence of that uncharged
misconduct is admissible even though it occurred subsequent to the
crime charged, because it arose from the same criminal activity. In
United States v. Poston, 9 the defendant was charged with misappro-
priating federally insured funds. 20 The trial court admitted evidence
showing that the defendant had attempted to negotiate a money order
that the government alleged was criminally obtained. The Eighth
Circuit held this evidence to be admissible because the attempted
negotiation of the money order was the defendant's attempt to "reap
the benefits" of the crime charged. 2 I The attempted negotiation was
therefore a part of the same criminal episode.122 In Kloock, Bass, and
Poston, the charged offenses were construed broadly to include acts of
the defendant that either accompanied, preceded, or followed the
crime charged, when the charged and the uncharged acts were con-
nected in the mind of the defendant.
4. UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE THAT FORMS AN
INTEGRAL PART OF A WITNESS' TESTIMONY ABOUT THE
CRIME CHARGED
When uncharged misconduct and the charged offense arose from
115. Id. at 1006.
116. Id. at 1007. Although evidence of the murder was treated as part of the same single
criminal transaction, had the murder been treated as a separate crime and introduced pursuant
to Rule 404(b), it would have been relevant to the defendant's motive for stealing the car, and
to explaining the defendant's flight from the murder scene.
117. 794 F.2d 1305 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 233 (1986).
118. Id. at 1312. The fact that the defendants had escaped from jail and stolen a number of
cars to make their getaway was relevant to the defendant's motive, knowledge, and intent.
Therefore, the evidence might have been admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b), had the
government satisfied the other requirements of the Rule.
119. 727 F.2d 734 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 962 (1984).
120. Id. at 734.
121. Id. at 740.
122. Id.
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the same criminal transaction, the uncharged and charged criminal
activity were linked in the mind of the defendant. Uncharged and
charged criminal acts also may be linked in the mind of the witness
when the uncharged misconduct evidence is linguistically inseparable
from the crime charged.123 Uncharged misconduct that forms a natu-
ral and integral part of a witness' account of the crime charged is
inextricably intertwined with the crime charged and is outside the
scope of Rule 404(b). 124 In United States v. Wilson,'25 the defendant
was charged with selling a controlled substance.' 26 A government
informant who had purchased the drugs from the defendant testified
that, at the time of the purchase, the defendant had also sold drugs to
a third party. 127  The court admitted this evidence because it com-
pleted the informant's account of his dealings with the defendant.
12
Had the witness avoided mentioning the uncharged act, his testimony
would have been awkward, and the narrative would have sounded less
credible. 1
29
If the omission of uncharged misconduct evidence causes the wit-
ness' testimony to become confusing, the uncharged misconduct evi-
dence is linguistically inseparable from the crime charged. In United
States v. Aleman, 3 0 the defendant was charged with possession with
intent to distribute heroin."' The Fifth Circuit upheld the trial
court's admission of evidence indicating that the defendant had given
a sample of cocaine to a government agent during a meeting between
the two. 13 2 The court permitted the witness to give a complete rendi-
tion of the crime as he knew it. The court noted that the agent's
123. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, § 6:24.
124. See United States v. Chilcote, 724 F.2d 1498, 1501 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1218 (1984) (Because the witness' testimony would have been comprehensible without
reference to evidence that the defendant piloted a plane to Colombia, that evidence related to
an extrinsic act.); United States v. Gonzalez, 661 F.2d 488, 493 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981)
(Testimonial evidence of the sale of the drug diazapam was not other crimes evidence under
Rule 404(b), because it completed the government witnesses' account of the entire incident.).
125. 598 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1978).
126. Id. at 67.
127. Id. at 72.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 592 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1979).
131. Id. at 883.
132. Id. at 885. Unlike the uncharged misconduct evidence in Aleman, which seemingly
would have been relevant to the defendant's knowledge or intent had the evidence been
brought in under Rule 404(b), in Wilson the uncharged misconduct evidence was apparently
not relevant to an ultimate issue in the case. If the prosecution in Wilson had been required to
articulate a specific theory of relevance before the evidence was admitted, however, the
practical result may have been to exclude the evidence. In turn, the witness might have
appeared less credible, because of the need to avoid mentioning the circumstances of the crime.
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testimony would have been incomplete and confusing without refer-
ence to the sample sale of cocaine, thus reducing its credibility.13 3
The uncharged crime evidence was, therefore, neither extrinsic to the
crime charged, nor within the scope of Rule 404(b).
134
5. UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE THAT COMPLETES THE
STORY OF THE CRIME CHARGED
In both Wilson and Aleman, the uncharged misconduct evidence
was not other crimes evidence governed by Rule 404(b) because it was
an integral part of a particular witness' version of the crime. Some
courts treat uncharged misconduct evidence that is not part of a par-
ticular witness' version of the crime, but nonetheless completes the
story of the charged offense, as inextricably intertwined with the
charged offense, and not within the scope of Rule 404(b). This type of
evidence gives jurors a clearer'understanding of the whole criminal
episode, even though the defendant has not been charged with every
criminal act within it.
In United States v. Turpin,'3 5 the defendant was convicted of
charges stemming from his attempt to derail a train.136 The defend-
ant challenged the introduction of evidence suggesting that he had
committed a murder shortly before the train had derailed, and that he
had hidden the victim's body in a car which he placed on the railroad
tracks, knowing that the car would be demolished by an oncoming
train.'37 The Eighth Circuit upheld the admission of evidence per-
taining to the murder because it was an integral part of the immediate
context of the crimes charged, and consequently was not within the
scope of Rule 404(b). 138
In Turpin, evidence of the murder at the site of the train derail-
ment showed events surrounding the crime that were attributable to
the defendant. Evidence setting the stage for the crime charged, yet
133. Id.
134. Id. at 886.
135. 707 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1983).
136. Id. at 332.
137. Id. at 335.
138. Id. at 336. It is unclear from the court's opinion whether the fact that the uncharged
misconduct was part of a single criminal episode took the evidence outside the scope of Rule
404(b), or whether that made it an acceptable purpose of other crimes evidence subject to a
Rule 404(b) analysis. The practical difference between these alternatives is slight, however,
because the court subjected the uncharged misconduct evidence to a Rule 403 analysis, and
gave a limiting instruction to the jury on the use of the evidence. Id.; see also United States v.
Caspers, 736 F.2d 1246, 1249 (8th Cir. 1984) (evidence of a prior drug transaction established
the events leading to the witness' cooperation with the government, thereby explaining the
context of the charged drug offense).
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not involving specific events in which the defendant participated, may
be offered to establish circumstances surrounding a charged offense.
In United States v. Weeks, 39 the Eleventh Circuit upheld the admis-
sion of evidence showing that the defendant, accused of assault, was
under investigation for stealing cars when he assaulted the federal
investigator. 11 The evidence did not involve specific acts of the
defendant, but rather, acts of the victim. The court noted that evi-
dence of this type, which completes the story of the crime charged, is
not evidence of extrinsic crimes, is not governed by Rule 404(b), and
therefore is admissible. 4 The fact that the defendant was under
investigation when he assaulted the federal agent gave the jurors a
comprehensive view of the criminal episode and facilitated a greater
understanding of the crime itself.
The absence of some information may cause the jury to become
confused or curious about the overall picture of the crime. In United
States v. Moore,142 the defendant, a convicted felon, was prosecuted
for interstate transportation of a firearm. 143 The defendant appealed
the introduction of evidence showing that the firearm had been found
in the course of a drug raid of the defendant's residence.' 44 The
Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's admission of the evidence to
explain the officers' presence in the defendant's house and avoid jury
confusion. 145 Had the jury not been told why the officers were in the
defendant's home, and how the gun had been found, they might have
become confused and curious, potentially creating their own explana-
tions for the aspects of the crime that were not explained. The Moore
court observed that a jury "cannot be expected to make its decision in
a void-without knowledge of the time, place and circumstances of
the acts which form the basis of the charge."' 146  Because the
uncharged misconduct evidence was necessary to avoid jury confu-
sion, the Moore court treated the evidence as outside the scope of
Rule 404(b).1
47
Not all federal appellate courts treat uncharged misconduct evi-
dence that completes the story of the charged crime as inextricably
intertwined evidence and outside the scope of Rule 404(b). In United
139. 716 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1983).
140. Id. at 830.
141. Id. at 832.
142. 735 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1984).
143. Id. at 290.






States v. Levy,' 4 8 the Second Circuit held that the trial court's admis-
sion of evidence pertaining to a drug transaction involving a small
amount of drugs for sampling was in error. 149 The sample drug trans-
action had occurred at a different time and place, and between differ-
ent people than those involved in the crime charged.150 At the sample
drug transaction, however, plans were laid for the larger drug sale for
which the defendants ultimately were charged. 5' The court noted
that, although the evidence completed the story of the crime charged,
the contemporaneous occurrence of the acts did not necessarily place
the evidence outside the scope of Rule 404(b). 52 Instead, the court
held that evidence of the sample drug transaction was admissible only
if: it qualified under an exception to Rule 404(b) clearly articulated
by the prosecution; the probative value was not substantially out-
weighed by the unfair prejudice; a limiting instruction was given to
the jury regarding its use of the evidence; and it otherwise complied
with Rule 404(b) admission standards. "I
Some courts that treat evidence that completes the story of the
crime charged as other crimes evidence governed by Rule 404(b)
admit such evidence without applying the stringent admission stan-
dards usually attached to Rule 404(b) evidence. The Fourth Circuit
noted, in United States v. Masters,5 4 that Rule 404(b) is inclusionary;
it prohibits the use of other crimes evidence to establish the defend-
ant's propensity to commit the crime charged, but permits the use of
other crimes evidence to provide the context within which the crime
occurred."' Citing the need to complete the story of the crime for
which the defendant is being tried by proving its immediate context or
res gestae, the Fourth Circuit upheld the trial court's admission of
prosecution tapes in which the defendant boasted about gun transac-
tions other than the one for which he was charged.' 56 The court
noted that suppression of parts of the res gestae would fragment the
148. 731 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1984).
149. Id. at 1002.
150. Id. at 1001.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1003.
153. Id. at 1004; see also United States v. Back, 588 F.2d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1979)
(Evidence showing that the defendant raped another woman around the same time that he
allegedly raped the victim was not admissible to explain the context within which the charged
rape occurred, unless some nexus of logical relevance existed between the first rape and the
charged rape, such that the evidence went, at least indirectly, to an element of the crime
charged.).
154. 622 F.2d 83 (4th Cir. 1980).
155. Id. at 86.
156. Id.
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event, and that the jury was entitled to know the setting of the case.157
After accepting this use of other crimes evidence, the court required
that the evidence be subjected to a Rule 403 analysis and to limiting
instructions to reduce the potential prejudice resulting from the
admission of the evidence, but did not require that the government
prove the evidence under a clear and convincing standard before
admission.5 8
Turpin, Weeks, Moore, Levy, and Masters illustrate that courts
have treated evidence that completes the story of the crime charged
inconsistently. Not all federal courts consider that Rule 404(b) gov-
erns the admissibility of this type of inextricably intertwined evidence.
When courts treat evidence that completes the story of the crime
charged within the scope of Rule 404(b), they consider the fact that
the evidence explains the context of the crime to be a proper purpose
for introducing other crimes evidence.' 59 The evidence is still subject
to a Rule 403 analysis and to instructions limiting the jurors' use of
the evidence.160 It is unclear, however, whether the government must
prove the evidence under a clear and convincing standard prior to
admission. The enactment of Rule 404(b) has done little to clarify the
appropriate treatment of evidence that completes the story of the
crime charged.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to
limit the circumstantial use of character evidence. Several different
types of proof can be used to establish a defendant's character: repu-
tation testimony, personal opinion testimony, and evidence of specific
acts of the defendant as reflective of his character. 16' Evidence per-
taining to specific acts, especially criminal acts, is the most persuasive
proof of a person's character, but it is also the most likely to distract,
157. Id.
158. Id. at 87. Another way of expressing the "completes the story" use of uncharged
misconduct evidence is to ask if excluding the evidence would create a chronological or
conceptual void in the prosecution's presentation of the case. See United States v. Swiatek, 819
F.2d 721, 727 (7th Cir. 1987) (The trial court erred in admitting evidence showing that the
defendant, who was charged with dealing in explosives, also was willing to fence stolen jewelry
and cars, because the exclusion of this evidence would not have left a conceptual void in the
story of the charged crime.); United States v. Hattaway, 740 F.2d 1419, 1425 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1028 (1984) (Evidence showing that while the victim was being kidnapped,
her boyfriend was murdered, was admissible other crimes evidence subject to a Rule 403
analysis, because excluding the evidence would have created a conceptual void.).
159. See United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d at 86 (4th Cir. 1980).
160. Id. at 88.
161. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 443.
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prejudice, or confuse the jury. 162 The introduction of specific past
conduct of the defendant may also be unduly time consuming, and
create a risk of unfair surprise to the defendant. 163 In recognition of
these special dangers, evidence introduced pursuant to Rule 404(b)
must have an independent, articulated theory of relevance; and, pur-
suant to Rule 403, a probative value that is not substantially out-
weighed by the risk of unfair prejudice created by the admission of the
evidence. To guard further against prejudice, the judge typically
instructs the jurors of the limited use that they may make of the
evidence.
Historically, the character rule was framed in an exclusionary
fashion; evidence of other crimes was not admissible unless it fit
within one of the recognized exceptions. Often the events surround-
ing the crime charged, in a spatial, temporal, or causal sense, did not
fit readily into one of the accepted uses of'the other crimes evidence
because of their proximity to the crime charged. The courts devel-
oped the res gestae or "completes the story" doctrine in order to
ensure that otherwise relevant evidence would not be excluded when
it incidentally involved uncharged criminal activity, because the
defendant had not been charged with all of his misconduct. The use
of the res gestae exception implied that the uncharged misconduct
was other crimes evidence as contemplated by the general rule.
The Federal Rules of Evidence apparently follow the inclusion-
ary approach to the rule regulating the admissibility of uncharged
misconduct evidence: Other crimes evidence is admissible if intro-
duced for a purpose other than to show the defendant's propensity to
commit the crime charged. As such, the category of evidence com-
pleting the story of the crime charged was implicitly included among
the acceptable uses of other crimes evidence. As the courts began to
articulate preadmission requirements for Rule 404(b) evidence, partic-
ularly the clear and convincing standard of proof prior to admission,
the courts were reluctant to subject res gestae evidence to these
requirements, because to do so would put too great a burden upon the
government. In order to evade the limitations of the rule, courts
avoided characterizing uncharged misconduct as other crimes evi-
dence. The necessarily vague term, "inextricably intertwined," was
coined to include those situations in which the evidence involved
uncharged criminal activity that was not wholly independent from the
crime charged.
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ship to the crime charged than does evidence of wholly independent
crimes. The inextricably intertwined evidence is causally, temporally,
or spatially connected to the crime charged, and the crime charged
and the uncharged acts both involved the defendant. The uncharged
misconduct evidence is not offered to prove the defendant's character
in order to imply that it was more likely that the defendant commit-
ted the crime charged, although in some cases an exact independent
theory of relevance may be difficult, if not impossible, to articulate.
Rather, the evidence is introduced to facilitate the jury's understand-
ing of the context within which the charged crime occurred, because
without this contextual setting the jury would be forced to reach a
verdict in a vacuum.
The concerns that prompted the development of the character
rule in general, and the other crimes rule in particular, are inapplica-
ble when the uncharged misconduct evidence is inextricably inter-
twined with the crime charged. The defendant will not be unduly
surprised or unprepared to meet evidence of events that were them-
selves related to, or occurred contemporaneously with, the crime for
which the defendant is being tried. The defendant should expect that
evidence of events incidentally involving uncharged misconduct that
was a necessary preliminary step toward completing the crime
charged, that was directly probative of the crime charged, or that
arose from the same criminal episode as the crime charged, will be
introduced by the prosecution in order to give a conceptually and
chronologically complete presentation of the situation to the jury.
Evidence providing the contextual setting of a case is not evidence of
a collateral matter that is unduly time consuming.
Inextricably intertwined evidence is not likely to be as prejudicial
as evidence of a wholly independent crime, because there is only one
event in issue, and the risk that the jury would infer a propensity from
one event is negligible. For example, a jury may well infer a propen-
sity to commit robbery if evidence was introduced showing that the
defendant had committed several unrelated robberies in the past year.
In contrast, evidence showing that, immediately prior to the bank
robbery in question, the defendant assaulted a guard at the bank does
not lead to the conclusion that a defendant has the propensity to rob
banks, although the evidence does tend to paint a negative picture of
the defendant's character. The jury will either believe that the
defendant committed both the charged and uncharged acts, or the
jury will believe that the defendant did not commit any of the acts.
Nor is inextricably intertwined evidence likely to unduly prejudice the
jurors, even if the evidence casts a negative light on the defendant's
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character. That the defendant assaulted a bank guard, prior to a bank
robbery is not so prejudicial as to assure the defendant's conviction.
Rather, in most cases, the defendant will be charged with the most
serious of his offenses, and the accompanying misconduct will appear
small in comparison.
Inextricably intertwined evidence includes: first, a necessary pre-
liminary occurrence intended to produce the criminal activity for
which the defendant is charged; second, uncharged misconduct that
arises from the same criminal episode as the crime charged; third,
uncharged misconduct that is directly probative of the crime charged;
fourth, evidence of uncharged misconduct necessarily included in a
particular witness' testimony regarding the crime charged; and fifth,
evidence that prevents jury confusion by completing the story of the
crime charged. Evidence of circumstances surrounding the crime that
does not involve criminal activity is admissible if it is logically rele-
vant to prove an ultimate issue in the case, and if its probative value is
not substantially outweighed by its potential for prejudice. Inextrica-
bly intertwined evidence is evidence of the surrounding circumstances
of the crime in a causal, temporal, or spatial sense, incidentally
revealing additional, but uncharged; criminal activity. As such, Rule
404(b) is inapplicable to inextricably intertwined evidence, and such
evidence should be subject to the same general admissibility require-
ments as other evidence that is used to provide the trier of fact with a
complete picture of the crime in question.
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